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A B S T R A C T
The wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo were perpretrated by a radical nationalist
Serbian cultural political consciousness that the American cultural political conscious-
ness and leadership had difficulty responding to and understanding. There is a great
cultural divide between a 'pathology' in Serbian culture, Milo{evi}'s radical national-
ism, and a humane 'naivete' in American cultural consciousness. I discuss why, finally,
American political leadership, Bill Clinton from Hope, Arkansas, responded to the trag-
edy of these wars. However, we are still left with the question of good vs evil: What is the
course of human history; psychotic political leadership causing repetitive human trag-
edy or can there be a higher humane and moral order to human cultural events?
In the 1990's the pathologies in Ser-
bian cultural/political consciousness cre-
ated stark realities and tragedies in
Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo which have
become juxtaposed and finally confronted
against the naivete and idealism in Ame-
rican culture. These realities and trage-
dies became focused upon a little boy
from Hope, Arkansas, who became our
president and now have ended in the re-
alities of a Kosovar refugee camp named
Hope in Albania. This confrontation is
across an insurmountable historical and
cultural divide between American and
Serbian political consciousness, an his-
torical and cultural divide which allows
little, if any, understanding. Yet, there
are hard facts and realities that reach
across that divide and have finally
touched our consciousness. We have re-
acted finally to murder, rape, pillage and
burning of homes, have reacted finally to
the genocide being committed by the
Serbs against first the Croatians, then
the Bosnians, and now the Albanian Ko-
sovars.
Radical Serb nationalists and their po-
litical actors such as Slobodan Milo{evi}
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come out of a psychologically closed and
complex cultural reality that is not neces-
sarily connected, except in mythic con-
sciousness, to historical reality. I believe
it is appropriate to say that Serbian polit-
ical/cultural definitions of reality which
emphasized historical persecutions of the
Serbian people, whether it had been by
Ottoman 'Turk', Croat 'Ustasha', or Alba-
nian Kosovar and which emphasized re-
venge for that history, or which empha-
sized that where-ever a Serb lived in the
former Yugoslavia that this was to be
part of a »Greater Serbia«; that these cul-
tural definitions promoted and created
psychopathic behavior which resulted in
the atrocities by the Serbian military and
para-militaries in Croatia, Bosnia and
Kosovo. I do not intend to review that his-
tory and myth other than to note that fi-
nally this Serb mentality exposes itself in
one absurd statement after another
about their identity and unity with Ser-
bian nationalism, with Kosovo being
their Jerusalem and their cradle of Ser-
bian civilization and that they will fight
to the death against the US and NATO
fascist aggressors. Their bravado was dis-
played on the Serbian propaganda TV
media as they stood on bridges over the
Danube with targets displayed on their
chests and they dared NATO to bomb.
They spoke in Orwellian terms about fas-
cist NATO, Nazi NATO and the US and
Bill Clinton being the aggressor and kill-
ing innocent Serb civilians as they show-
ed on Belgrade TV bombed out homes,
hospitals, buses and retirement homes in
Belgrade and Novi Sad. We showed their
TV propaganda coverage of the war and
we let them talk in interview after inter-
view and they revealed their psycho/cul-
tural pathology and their Orwellian
thinking. They talked on and on and they
still didn't get it, didn't realize what they
revealed about themselves. And, this is a
basic difference between their undemo-
cratic and mentally closed, myopic cul-
ture and our open, critical and demo-
cratic society; an open society exposes hy-
pocrisy and pathological thinking and be-
havior.
From our critical and democratic Wes-
tern press coverage I want to review some
of the observations and statements that
have been made in relation to American
political consciousness and our leader-
ship, comments about President Bill
Clinton. We have witnessed over the
years of the Serbian aggression in Croa-
tia, Bosnia, and now in Kosovo, an appar-
ent reluctance of the US to get involved in
this »European« problem. Yet, it has be-
come apparent that underneath this re-
luctance we had been making decisions
and had been responding, e.g., our allow-
ing the Croatians to build an army even
though there was a UN arms embargo
and our European allies objected. We
even, under the guise of a private corpo-
ration, trained the Croatian army officer
corp which successfully expelled the Ser-
bian military occupation of the Croatian
Krajina and parts of Slavonia. This in-
volvement and leadership continued with
the Dayton Accords in November, 1995,
which finally brought about a quasi-set-
tlement of the Bosnian conflict, but only
after US leadership and NATO had fi-
nally bombed Serbian military positions
in Bosnia. Only with force did we finally
get the Serbian leadership to respond,
but only after they had committed un-
speakable atrocities against the Croat
and Muslim Bosnian population. But, it
seemed that we didn't learn from Serbian
deceit, lies, and their psychopathologies
which they carried out in such places as
Omarska and Serbrenica and we allowed
the Kosovo nightmare to erupt. Now we
ask why? Why did the Serbian atrocities
in Kosovo even have to happen? Why was
our response delayed and apparently
bungled? Why wasn't Mladi} arrested?
Why did we allow Milo{evi} to remain in
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power? Because we needed him as a pea-
ce-maker?
The critique of Clinton reveals some
explanation. Then we have to ask; Why
the critique? Hugo Young in the Guard-
ian stated: »Bill Clinton does not want to
lead... We are witnessing, I believe, the
slow disintegration of American purpo-
se«1. The Berlin Zeitung noted; »Clinton's
chance to go down in History as a strate-
gic thinker is vanishing«(ibid). Tony Blair
had to become the spokesperson for a
hardening NATO position on Kosovo:
Blair stating that this is »a just war« and
stressing that NATO will not negotiate
with Milo{evi} – that Milo{evi} must ac-
cept NATO's demands. However, Germa-
ny's Schroeder and Italy's prime minister,
Massimo D'Alema weakened their posi-
tion, not wanting to commit to a forced in-
vasion of Kosovo, other than the air stri-
kes. »Meanwhile, Mr. Blair was depic-
ted daily in the British press as a stout-
hearted Churchillian leader pressing a
reluctant Mr. Clinton to screw up his
courage and threaten Belgrade with inva-
sion unless Mr. Milo{evi} accepts NATO's
terms«2. And, it seems that it took the
British foreign secretary Robin Cook to
state it once again (for Clinton?): »There
will not be a settlement on any terms that
do not provide for the return of all refu-
gees, and they will not return until they
know the Serbs have withdrawn and NA-
TO has entered Kosovo«3. And, if Milo{e-
vi} wasn't listening, Jamie Shea, every
day as NATO spokesperson, stated over
and over the demands of NATO; total
Serb military, police, etc. withdrawal
from Kosovo, return of the Kosovar refu-
gees, autonomy for Kosovo, and demo-
cratic elections.
The Serbs have a propensity to rede-
fine reality and meaning for their politi-
cal purposes (the 1389 field of black-
birds'defeat became an identity?) and
their propaganda continued with daily
accusation and pictures of »Nazi« NATO
bombing 'atrocities' on innocent Serb ci-
vilians. The Serbs just wouldn't get it.
Their reporters kept asking Jamie Shea
at the daily NATO briefings about the lat-
est Serb civilian casualties from the
NATO bombing and he replied: »I have
some civilian casualty figures for you...
1,582,345 displaced people and refugees
resulting from the Serb actions in Kosovo
– 93% of the original population of Ko-
sovo; 225,000 men missing; at least 6000
killed in summary executions; and 10
mass graves«3. Then some more truth
about the Serbs comes out. On May l3th
NATO bombed a warehouse compound in
Kosovo – killing more than 80 Kosovar
refugees. The Serbs spread the horrible
images of this carnage on their TV and
before the world. However, weeks later,
refugee survivors from that NATO bomb-
ing successfully fled to Albania and re-
ported that the Serb soldiers herded
them, 700 of them, into the compound
and locked the gate – they were put there
intentionally knowing that the ware-
house was a NATO target. The Serbs cre-
ated this situation for their propaganda
purposes, as they did elsewhere in Ko-
sovo, mixing Kosovars into their military
convoys and placing them next to targets;
using them as civilian shields to create ci-
vilian casualties4.
All of this finally played out before the
American public and we started to get
polls showing that Americans supported
the NATO bombing and would even sup-
port military action on the ground to stop
the Serb killing in Kosovo. The endless
pictures on the evening TV news cover-
age of Serb atrocities and the refugees
streaming from Kosovo, all one million of
them, finally got to a basic American con-
sciousness that the Serbs don't have a
clue about. We do have morals and a ba-
sic sense of humanity of what is humane
and what should be reasonable human
behavior. We had this reaction with the
Serb atrocities in Bosnia and then it all
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seemed to slide from our consciousness
and the Serbs repeated it all in Kosovo.
Those that kept watch on Milo{evi} and
the Serbs knew that this would happen
again like it did in Kosovo. Why wasn't
America watching, or for that matter, Eu-
rope?
With the British, maybe it required a
change in government from that of John
Major's complicity with the Serbs and
Milo{evi} through Lord Owen and David
Hume. For the British to respond to the
moral outrage of Milo{evi} in Kosovo it
apparently required the change to the re-
freshing moral honesty of Tony Blair and
Robin Cook. With the US and our failure
to respond strongly and militarily, I think
that the explanation lies in our domestic
politics and the personality makeup of
that little boy from Hope, Arkansas.
Though Clinton admired John Ken-
nedy as a role model, he was part of an
American generation that reacted
against the US involvement in Vietnam
that Kennedy played such a large role in
committing the US towards. Clinton's
lesson from Vietnam was that we should
not have been involved, that we should
not have sacrificed Americans, much less
the huge number of Vietnamese that
were killed. Clinton will not, if he can
help it, get himself in the position of hav-
ing American servicemen killed in the sit-
uation in Bosnia and now Kosovo. That,
of course, was a position in the Bush ad-
ministration towards the breakdown of
Yugoslavia in the late 1980's and was the
position of General Colin Powell, chief of
staff. Not another Vietnam. Besides, with
the end of the cold war and the collapse of
the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia was no lon-
ger important for US interests in Europe.
Milo{evi} understood this and he would
have a free hand with his Serbian psycho-
pathic military methodologies for a grea-
ter Serbia.
Clinton, as everyone now knows, is a
poll watcher and the polls kept saying
that the American public did not consider
the events in Yugoslavia as an American
interest. Clinton also had to deal with the
Republicans in Congress and they did not
consider that any US military commit-
ment to stopping Milo{evi}'s killings in
Croatia and Bosnia was in American in-
terests. However, the Serbian atrocities
against the Bosnians in Sarajevo, Sre-
brenica, etc., as put before the American
public'in the evening news with some ex-
cellent news analysis articles, finally be-
came too much for US and European
senses of humanity. Clinton could now
follow the polls and American revulsion
to these atrocities and we finally had the
NATO air strikes which brought Milo-
{evi} to Dayton, Ohio for the cease fire ac-
cords in Bosnia. This would become the
model for NATO's reaction in Kosovo; it
can be done with air strikes. But, what a
surprise it was. I really never believed
that NATO (or Bill Clinton) would order
air strikes beyond Kosovo. They struck
right to the heart of Serbia, right to Bel-
grade, fulfilling the words to the Croatian
song, »Belgrade is burning«. But, tragi-
cally, NATO's air strikes were not enough
to stop the Serb military and para-mi-
litaries from executing many and expel-
ling the Albanian population from Ko-
sovo. Our Vietnam syndrome prevented a
complete moral reaction on our part and
we refused to allow any US service men,
or NATO service men, to participate in a
ground operation to stop the Serbian kill-
ing, looting and burning. No American
young man should die in this Balkan pa-
thos.
But, backing up a minute, this has
been »Madeleine's War«, at least that was
the feature story in Time magazine, May
17, 1999. Our foreign policy in the Clin-
ton administration has been shaped, I be-
lieve, by our Secretary of State and the
State Department; remember, Bill Clin-
ton is from Hope, Arkansas, a rather pro-
vincial place to say the least. Clinton's
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first Secretary of State Warren Christo-
pher's policy towards Bosnia was expres-
sed in his mentor's role, Cyrus Vance's ac-
quiescence in letting Lord Owen and
John Major's foreign office take the lead,
a pro-Serb lead which seemed to believe
in a myth of Serbian military capability.
And, of course, all of this was under the
auspices of the UN which could not make
assertive decisions against Serbia becau-
se of the Russian and Chinese member-
ship in the security council. So, this has
all played out in a complicated way: an
American public and body politic scared
by Vietnam; divisive Republican/Demo-
crat politics in the US, especially the im-
peachment trial of Bill Clinton distract-
ing him and Congress from the affairs of
our government such as Kosovo; Euro-
pean political leadership, British and
French, which was, if anything, pro-Serb,
and not of a fortitude to militarily deal
with Serbia by themselves; and a UN
which is incapable of responding to post-
cold war politics because of cold war men-
talities in the security council.
So, how does it all come down to being
»Madeleine's War«? Because Kosovo fi-
nally comes down to being genocide, Ser-
bian genocide against the Albanian Ko-
sovars. It has been such for a couple of
decades. But, genocide is a word that we
very carefully have refused to use, so we
have had the euphemism of »ethic cleans-
ing,« a term coined by our State Depart-
ment for the Serbian atrocities in Bosnia.
But, I believe that Albright has been out-
raged by the Serbian actions in Bosnia
and Kosovo and that it is likely that her
Jewish background and her family flee-
ing the Nazi Holocaust does play a role.
But, it really takes no more than to un-
derstand her as a decent American lib-
eral intellectual. And, perhaps a women
simply will not put up with the pathologi-
cal male killing behavior which occurred
in Kosovo and which had occurred earlier
in Bosnia and Croatia. So, she does play a
pivotal role and maybe her statement to
General Colin Powell challenging his doc-
trine that we must have clear political
goals before the military is to be used
with decisive force is revealing: »What's
the point of having this superb military
that you're always talking about if we
can't use it?«5. Finally, through NATO, we
used the superb military, at least part of
it.
However, the air war ground on, day
after day. We were naïve enough to think
that Milo{evi} would give in. But, the
Serbian actions in Kosovo, and in Bosnia
and Croatia before, go beyond Milo{evi}
to the ultra-right wing nationalist hard-
liners, the Serbian military officers and
the para-militaries that have grown rich
from killing and pillaging Bosnians and
Kosovars. Too large a part of Serbian soci-
ety has a stake in all that the nationalists
have created and many of them have
even participated directly in the terrible
killing. Tomorrow, with blood still on
their hands they will walk the streets of
Belgrade: Their myth about the field of
blackbirds and their defeat by the Otto-
mans in 1389 added to and replaced by a
new myth about their defeat by NATO
and the US - the new injustice in Kosovo
redefining their paranoid persecution
identity into the 1990's.
And, where does American naivete
come into all of these events? For me to
understand this I've had to come to Tur-
key and to become aware of a reality that
one archaeological site after another has
brought home to me. It is in realizing the
depth of culture and history here that I
achieve an understanding that my years
in Croatia also gave me, but not as dra-
matically as in Turkey. It is a reality that
Americans in their short history really
don't grasp. Turkey is ancient Greece and
so much more in its historical time depth
and complexity, a complexity that gives
the Serbs little excuse for their »trauma«
of 1389 AD. Turkey is an overlay after
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overlay of one culture after another
through not the centuries, but thousands
of years.
Turkey is where we find early Ne-
anderthal sites and suggestions of even
earlier hominid evolution. But, more im-
portantly, Anatolia is where domestica-
tion of plants and animals may have ta-
ken place, where the foundations of early
horticulture, village life, pottery, metal-
lurgy and the other characteristics of
early civilization are found. It is Cha-
talhoyuk where 9000 years ago a Neo-
lithic city developed. It is where that
»third« great ancient civilization devel-
oped in the Middle East, the Bronze Age
Hittites. They challenged Ramses II's
Egypt and then faded from history when
pressured by the Ionians and with their
decline came the Phrygians and Lydians.
The Ionians laid the foundations for Hel-
lenic civilization, then the Persians in-
vaded. At Chanakkale, at the narrows in
the Hellespont, the Dardanelles, you can
see where King Xerxes of Persia invaded
Greece and a century later Alexander the
Great invaded Asia. At Troy you see not
just where Homer's account of the Trojan
war took place, but the nine layers of
building and destruction and building,
but maybe 40 some layers of death, de-
struction and renewal. So it goes as one
discovers that this was where ancient
Greece was to be replaced by Rome. At
Ephesus, Smyrna, Sardis, Hierapolis, Mi-
letus, the list goes on and on, seemingly
to countless ancient cities. The story is
the same; one civilization replaced by an-
other. How much death and destruction?
Then the Christians secretly developed
their religion in these Roman cities and
Paul came to preach, and John writes to
the seven cities in Revelations and then
Constantine and Justinian will build the
Byzantine Empire. Then come the Se-
ljuks who will create the first great Turk-
ish state to rule Anatolia, then the Otto-
mans and Suleyman the Magnificent.
How much ethnic cleansing took place
through all of this history? The Ottomans
conquer and expand their empire. The
Serbs come in here somewhere? When in
Turkey they seem rather insignificant.
What is all this 1389 and the field of
Blackbirds about?
How significant is this Serbian myth
of Kosovo? When I finished looking at
Troy, as with the other ancient sites that
I've looked at in Turkey, I am impressed
with the fact that a reality of history is
that cities, cultures, civilizations have
been constantly overrun by conquerors;
burned, destroyed and populations killed,
over and over again, thus the »levels« ac-
cumulate. The thousands of people who
labored to build these cities, peasants
and slaves, then died in these constant
assaults by those who wanted to rape,
kill, vandalize and destroy them. Where
are their remains? Where are their de-
scendants? There is now nothing but
piles of stone, so laboriously cut and sha-
ped, layer upon layer covered with meters
of soil. Is this the »natural« course of hu-
man events which is now being expressed
in Kosovo? Pathological and self-serving
military and political leaders turning the
male animal loose to rape and kill, to
»ethnically cleanse« and destroy, express-
ing some deeper genetic meaning of who
we really are? Maybe there is a reality
about our »heros« of history. What kind of
pathologies were in the makeup of Aga-
memnon, Alexander the Great, and Su-
leyman the Magnificent?
Are Americans naive to this reality of
the human character and the layers of
death and destruction that we have cre-
ated? Is Milo{evi} what history is all
about and we should not be involved with
NATO and the Kosovo problem? Or, are
we above Milo{evi} and the Serbs to a
higher level of humanity and moral hu-
man behavior as we enter the 2lst Cen-
tury? Is that what the refugee camp in Al-
bania named Hope is a reminder of; that
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there is a higher level of human behav-
ior? Or, is the little boy from Hope, Ar-
kansas who is now president, our presi-
dent who wants to feel your pain, to
console you; is he an expression of our
American naivete? Maybe Milo{evi} and
the Serbs who support him, who have
benefitted from his goals, are what real-
ity and history are all about; the layers
upon layers of cultures destroyed by one
psychopath after another.
Forensic psychiatrist Park Dietz, an
expert on psychopathic behavior, in re-
sponse to the question: »With all that
you've seen, how do you retain a positive
view of human nature? Or do you believe
that people are basically good?« Dietz:
»No. No. I think people are inherently
self-aggrandizing, pleasureseeking, un-
empathic, self-serving, greedy and lust-
ful«6.
Dietz's conclusion from his research
into the behavior of mass murderers
might explain the human behavior that
produced layer upon layer of death and
destruction that archeology reveals in an-
cient city states. Maybe his conclusions
are a profile of Milo{evi}'s and his Ser-
bian nationalist supporter's behavior and
their manipulation of the xenophobic
paranoia and persecution complex in Ser-
bian cultural identity, e.g., the 1389 field
of blackbirds myth. But, Dietz's conclu-
sion about human nature doesn't explain
the »higher human purpose« we finally
found in our moral outrage and our re-
sponse to help the victims of these Ser-
bian psycho-cultural pathologies and stop
Milo{evi}'s war in Kosovo. Maybe there is
»hope« for positive idealism in human na-
ture; that good can prevail over patholog-
ical evil.
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HOPE, ARKANSAS ZA NADU, ALBANIJA: NAIVNOST I IDEALIZAM
SPRAM REALITETA I TRAGEDIJE
S A @ E T A K
Ratovi u Hrvatskoj, Bosni i Hercegovini i na Kosovu su bili po~injeni od strane ra-
dikalne nacionalisti~ke srpske kulturne politi~ke svijesti, na koju je ameri~ka kuturna
politi~ka svijest i vodostvo s te{ko}om u razumijevanju odgovaralo. Postoje velike kul-
turne razlike izme|u »patologije« u srpskoj kulturi, Milo{evi}evog radikalnog nacio-
nalizma i humanisti~ke naivnosti ameri~ke kulturne svijesti. U radu razmatram raz-
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loge za{to je, napokon, ameri~ko politi~ko vodstvo, na ~elu kojeg je Bill Clinton iz Hope,
Arkansasa, odgovorilo na tragediju ovih ratova. No usprkos tome, ostavljeni smo s pi-
tanjem dobra naspram zla: Koji je tijek ljudske povijesti; psihoti~kog politi~kog vodstva
koje uzrokuje ponavljanje ljudskih tragedija ili postojanje vi{e humanog i moralnog
reda u kulturnim doga|ajima u ljudi?
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